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NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Aboul-Enein
and Norton: Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Moham

Today’s headlines are filled with discussions questioning the ethics of launching
unmanned weapons (drones) against
targets when nearby innocent civilians
might be killed or injured by an attack.
It is interesting to reflect on the ethical
ramifications of launching thousands
of unmanned weapons (the fu-go balloons) against an entire continent, with
no ability to predict within thousands
of miles where the weapons would
strike or who would be injured or killed.
Such attacks today would certainly
violate the law of armed conflict, but
they must be judged within the context of warfare in the last century.
I strongly recommend this book to
those with an interest in the technology of warfare, and to those
who may have heard of the balloon
bomb attacks and thought them
to be almost-mythical events.
JOHN E. JACKSON

Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War
Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–
1971, ed. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 320 pages.
$10.94.

Few states in modern times have seen
their military beaten as badly as Egypt
did in 1967—and have that military
survive. Even fewer, perhaps no others, have then deliberately rebuilt that
defeated force to a point at which a
mere five years later it could again offer
battle and, arguably, produce victory.
How the Egyptians accomplished this
has been something of an incomplete
and little-known story up to now. This is
mainly due to a lack of translated articles
and writings penned by senior Egyptian
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leaders. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein has,
with this volume, begun to fill in some
of the major gaps in the account.
Aboul-Enein’s book is actually a collection of articles initially published
in Infantry magazine. Each of the
original accounts was written by General
Mohamed Fawzi, the man handpicked
by Nasser to build the defeated and
demoralized Egyptian forces into a
professional, combined-arms military
that could retake and hold occupied
Egyptian territory. Fawzi served as war
minister for both Nasser and Sadat and
was the master architect of the stunningly successful creation of professionalism
in the Egyptian armed forces. His voice,
despite whatever biases and personal
axes to grind he may bring to the table,
deserves to be heard, and Aboul-Enein’s
translation gives Fawzi that opportunity.
Fawzi’s challenge was massive. The preFawzi army was much more involved
with state security than with power
projection or war fighting. As the 1967
war had revealed, the Egyptian armed
forces, even with Soviet equipment,
were woefully inferior technologically
to Israeli forces. The Egyptian army was
riddled with low morale and displayed
an apparently well-deserved inferiority complex. Its soldiery was, for the
most part, uneducated and poorly
trained. The Egyptian high command
was overcentralized, overpoliticized,
and, as events had proved, unable to
exercise anything like the command and
control required in modern combat.
The end of the war both left Israel with
strategic depth and turned the Suez
Canal into a natural defensive barrier
that was further fortified with a series
of formidable defensive positions.
Fawzi admits to having certain unusual advantages in accomplishing his
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mission. Nasser was willing to give his
new war minister as close to a blank
check as could be imagined. Nothing
was more important than securing a
victory and expunging the shame of
1967. Furthermore, the Soviet Union
became a guaranteed supplier of
military hardware, not only making
up the quantitative Egyptian losses but
substantially improving equipment
quality as well. Fawzi makes the point
that the Soviets were less motivated by
a common ideology in this effort than
by the need to prove that their equipment was at least on a par with that of
the United States, and to maintain their
geopolitical position in the region. Fawzi
also confirms that the Soviet presence
on the ground was extensive, that Soviet
forces not only advised but performed
certain military duties as well.
Fawzi brought new capabilities to Egypt
and improved others. Surface-launched
ship-to-ship missiles, modern surfaceto-air missile batteries, new armor
and aircraft all entered the Egyptian
inventory. Fawzi understood, however, that new hardware would not be
enough. Military-school attendance was
increased, and the military’s intellectual capabilities expanded. But beyond
that, he explains, the three-year “war
of attrition” that Egypt waged against
Israel (1967–70) was a deliberate effort
to blood the Egyptian army, test new
tactics, and deploy new forces. Over this
period, Fawzi argues, the Israeli forces
came to embrace a defensive mind‑set,
while the Egyptian army became
imbued with the spirit of the offensive.
Although most books claim Israel won
the war of attrition, Fawzi claims this
was not the case. According to Fawzi,
not only did Israeli jets increasingly
avoid Egyptian airspace, but Egyptian
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soldiers underwent quantum improvements as well—and these improvements
were the real war aims of this period.
It is also clear that whatever strategic
deterrent the Israeli leaders thought they
might have against the Egyptians did
not work when it came to preventing at
least a limited war. As the Egyptian army
began to believe in itself, Fawzi and his
officers crafted plans for what would
become one of the most successful setpiece battles of the twentieth century:
the 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal
and the breaching of the Bar-Lev line.
Reproducing the Infantry articles, complete with their original and somewhat
repetitive forewords, gives the book
something of a choppy feel. It is also
clear that this work is a synopsis of
Fawzi’s memoirs, not a complete translation. Some readers will be left with a
desire to know more. Not surprisingly,
the focus of the book tends to be at
the strategic level. Readers who want
more tactical details will have to find
them elsewhere. Unfortunately for our
understanding of Egyptian perspectives
of how the war was waged, Fawzi was relieved of his duties two years before the
war began and was arrested for conspiring to overthrow Sadat, so this critical
element is sadly lacking. However, these
shortcomings pale when compared
with the value inherent in this work.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military,
by George E. Reed. Lincoln, Neb.: Potomac
Books, 2015. 216 pages. $26.50.

Although the term “toxic leadership” has
recently come into vogue, the U.S. military is no stranger to the phenomenon.
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